Related provisions for MAR 1.3.18
1 - 11 of 11 items.
The following behaviours are, in the opinion of the
FSA
, market abuse (insider dealing):(1) dealing on the basis of inside information which is not trading information; (2) front running/pre-positioning - that is, a transaction for a person's own benefit, on the basis of and ahead of an order which he is to carry out with or for another (in respect of which information concerning the order is inside information), which takes advantage of the anticipated
In the opinion of the
FSA
, the following factors are to be taken into account in determining whether or not a person's behaviour is in pursuit of legitimate business, and are indications that it is:(1) the extent to which the relevant trading by the person is carried out in order to hedge a risk, and in particular the extent to which it neutralises and responds to a risk arising out of the person's legitimate business; or(2) whether, in the case of a transaction
In the opinion of the
FSA
, the following factors are to be taken into account in determining whether or not a person's behaviour is dutiful execution of an order on behalf of another, and are indications that it is:(1) whether the person has complied with the applicable provisions of
COBS2
, or their equivalents in the relevant jurisdiction; or2(2) whether the person has agreed with its client it will act in a particular way when
Behaviour, based on inside information relating to another company, in the context of a public takeover bid or merger for the purpose of gaining control of that company or proposing a merger with that company, does not of itself amount to market abuse (insider dealing) [Note: see Recital 29 Market Abuse Directive], including:(1) seeking from holders of securities, issued by the target, irrevocable undertakings or expressions of support to accept an offer to acquire those securities
The following examples of market abuse (insider dealing) concern the definition of inside information relating to financial instruments other than
commodity derivatives.(1) X, a director at B PLC has lunch with a friend, Y. X tells Y that his company has received a takeover offer that is at a premium to the current share price at which it is trading. Y enters into a spread bet priced or valued by reference to the share price of B PLC based on his expectation that
The following example of market abuse (insider dealing) concerns the definition of inside information relating to commodity derivatives.Before the official publication of LME stock levels, a metals trader learns (from an insider) that there has been a significant decrease in the level of LME aluminium stocks. This information is routinely made available to users of that
prescribed market
. The trader buys a substantial number of futures in that metal on
The following example of market abuse (insider dealing)concerns the definition of inside information relating to pending client orders.A dealer on the trading desk of a firm dealing in oil derivatives accepts a very large order from a client to acquire a long position in oil futures deliverable in a particular month. Before executing the order, the dealer trades for the firm and on his personal account by taking a long position in those oil futures, based on the expectation that
The following connected examples of market abuse (insider dealing) concerns the differences in the definition of inside information for commodity derivatives and for other financial instruments.(1) A person deals, on a
prescribed market
, in the equities of XYZ plc, a commodity producer, based on inside information concerning that company. (2) A person deals, in a commodity futures contract traded on a
prescribed market
, based
(1) Delaying disclosure of inside information will not always mislead
the public, although a developing situation should be monitored so that if
circumstances change an immediate disclosure can be made.(2) Investors understand that some
information must be kept confidential until developments are at a stage when
an announcement can be made without prejudicing the legitimate interests of
the issuer.
(1) does not envisage that an issuer will: DTR 2.5.3 R (1) does
not allow an issuer to delay
public disclosure of the fact that it is in financial difficulty or of its
worsening financial condition and is limited to the fact or substance of the
negotiations to deal with such a situation. An issuer cannot
delay disclosure of inside information on
the basis that its position in subsequent negotiations to deal with the situation
will be jeopardised by the disclosure of its financial
An issuer should
not be obliged to disclose impending developments that could be jeopardised
by premature disclosure. Whether or not an issuer has
a legitimate interest which would be prejudiced by the disclosure of certain inside information is an assessment which
must be made by the issuer in
the first instance. However, the FSA considers that, other than in
relation to impending developments or matters described in DTR 2.5.3 R or DTR 2.5.5A R1, there are unlikely to be other
(1) When an issuer is
permitted to delay public disclosure of inside
information in accordance with DTR 2.5.1 R, it may selectively disclose
that information to persons owing
it a duty of confidentiality.(2) Such selective disclosure may be
made to another person if it
is in the normal course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties.
However, selective disclosure cannot be made to any person simply
because they owe the issuer a
duty of confidentiality. For example,
In the opinion of the
FSA
, the following factors are to be taken into account in determining whether or not a person could reasonably be expected to know that information in his possession is inside information and therefore whether he is an insider under section 118B(e) of the Act, and indicate that the person is an insider:(1) if a normal and reasonable person in the position of the person who has inside information would know or should have known that
In the opinion of the
FSA
, the following factors are to be taken into account in determining whether or not information is generally available, and are indications that it is (and therefore not inside information):(1) whether the information has been disclosed to a prescribed market through a regulatory information service or RIS or otherwise in accordance with the rules of that market;(2) whether the information is contained in records which are open to
The following are examples of
behaviour
that might fall within the scope of section 123(1)(b) :(1) a director of a company, while in possession of inside information, instructs an employee of that company to
deal in qualifying investments or related investments in respect of which the information is inside information;(2) a person recommends or advises a friend to engage in
behaviour
which, if he himself engaged
An issuer and
its advisers are best placed to make an initial assessment of whether particular
information amounts to inside information.
The decision as to whether a piece of information is inside
information may be finely balanced and the issuer (with
the help of its advisers) will need to exercise its judgement.Note:DTR 2.7 provides additional guidance
on dealing with market rumour.
(1) Subject to the limited ability
to delay release of inside information to
the public provided by DTR 2.5.1 R, an issuer is
required to notify, via a RIS,
all inside information in its
possession as soon as possible.(2) If an issuer is
faced with an unexpected and significant event, a short delay may be acceptable
if it is necessary to clarify the situation. In such situations a holding
announcement should be used where an issuer believes
that there is a danger of inside information
The FSA is aware that many issuers provide unpublished information to
third parties such as analysts, employees, credit rating agencies, finance
providers and major shareholders, often in response to queries from such parties.
The fact that information is unpublished does not in itself make it inside information. However, unpublished
information which amounts to inside information is
only permitted to be disclosed in accordance with the disclosure
rules and an issuer must
ensure
The following behaviours are, in the opinion of the FSA, market abuse (improper disclosure):(1) disclosure of inside information by the director of an issuer to another in a social context; and(2) selective briefing of analysts by directors of issuers or others who are persons discharging managerial responsibilities.
In the opinion of the
FSA
whether the disclosure is permitted by the rules of a
prescribed market
, of the
FSA
or the Takeover Code; or, the following factors are to be taken into account in determining whether or not the disclosure was made by a person in the proper course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties, and are indications that it was:(1) whether the disclosure is permitted by the rules
Where there is press speculation
or market rumour regarding an issuer,
the issuer should assess whether
a disclosure obligation arises under DTR 2.2.1 R. To do this an issuer will need to carefully assess whether
the speculation or rumour has given rise to a situation where the issuer has inside
information.
Examples of when the FSA may require the suspension of trading of a financial instrument include:(1) if an issuer fails to make a RIS announcement as required by the disclosure rules within the applicable time-limits which the FSA considers could affect the interests of investors or affect the smooth operation of the market; or(2) if there is or there may be a leak of inside information and the issuer is unwilling or unable to issue an appropriate RIS announcement within a reasonable